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Abstract
This paper proposes a theoretical model for the decision of voter registration, which recovers
the classical notion that democracy is a public good. The solution of the citizen's problem implies
three types of Nash equilibrium (null, partial, and full enrollment), where the real cost for voter
enrollment and appreciation for democracy are the key variables. In the partial-enrollment
equilibrium, the citizens' democratic valuation has a threshold that encourages a free-rider
behavior even when the homogeneous-citizens assumption is not met. In turn, a policy maker
could avoid this threat of representativeness crisis by setting an optimal enrollment cost that
depends on electorate size and citizens' heterogeneity. Finally, an empirical model is outlined
from the policy maker's problem, which is coherent with classical literature on voting behavior.
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JEL classication: D72
1. Introduction
The voting behavior theory is based on the pioneer work of Anthony Downs (1957) and Gor-
don Tullock in 1967 (cited by Barzel and Silberberg, 1973), but it was mainly developed in the
1970s and the 1980s. In these decades, the eorts were focused on giving a theoretical back-
ground to the electoral involvement, where the inclusion of economic rationality into the analy-
sis was crucial (Frey, 1971; Stigler, 1972; Barzel and Silberberg, 1973; Tollison and Willett, 1973;
Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974; May and Martin, 1975; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983, 1985). After-
ward, the rst empirical tests aimed to identify the relevance of social and economic variables over
voter turnout (Silberman and Durden, 1975; Tollison et al., 1975; Settle and Abrams, 1976).
Thenceforth, the vast evidence about electoral participation and election outcomes has been incon-
clusive. The ecological fallacy critique stated by Matsusaka and Palda (1993) called into question
most of the previous evidence obtained from aggregated data. Lichtman (1974) and Kramer (1983)
previously noted this drawback and pointed out that macro-level regressions exhibit more suitable
properties than individual survey estimates. In fact, Kramer remarked that these properties were
especially observed when the aggregated model was well-specied.
Nonetheless, recent empirical articles (e.g., Brender, 2003; Cerda and Vergara, 2008; Aleksynska,
2011) are still hypothesizing about the relationship between a set of economic, social, or political
variables and turnout, abstention, electoral performance, or civic participation. On the other hand,
Ansolabehere and Konisky (2006) stressed the long-term impact of registration laws on turnout in
the United States. Although the above evidence on turnout is interesting, the underlying assump-
tions used in these empirical models are not always revealed.
This paper addresses the lack of theoretical discussion on voter registration and proposes a model
for the voter enrollment decision. The background of the model considers a democratic society
with a mandatory voting rule1. In addition, the optimal solution of the model enables to outline
an empirical model where a set of structural regressors are identied.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the model for the voter registration
decision. Section 3 presents an explicit solution for the citizen's problem. Section 4 develops the
policy maker's problem, identies some policy implications, and proposes an empirical test for the
model. Section 5 concludes.
2. Modeling the decision of voter registration
Suppose that a democratic society allows voluntary voter registration but mandatory voting. This
society is populated by n citizens where each citizen i has preferences over a consumption good,
leisure, and democracy.
The demand for the consumption good is denoted by x, which price is px.
The available time is allocated as follows. Each citizen i spends a fraction hi in the labor market
and earns a nominal wage, w. On the other hand, the individual enjoys a fraction li of leisure
1Such as the one adopted by Australia, Singapore, Brazil, or Chile until 2012.
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in the form of costless activities that are linked to citizen participation. Thus, the citizen's time
constraint is: li + hi = 1.
Since the citizens value the democratic institutions that prevail in the society, then they contribute
to strengthening democracy, d, by being part of the electoral roll. This insight is coherent with the
classical notion exposed by Downs (1957) that democracy is a public good. Thus, a higher political
engagement will guarantee the stability of the political system.
Therefore, the utility function for citizen i is given by:
(1) ui(xi; li; d)
Where u() is a continuous, increasing, and at least twice dierentiable function in x, l, and d.
Under this democratic context, each citizen must decide whether being or not part of civic life
through voter enrollment, which decision is represented by variable ri. If citizen i decides to be
enrolled in the voter register, then ri will be equal to one and zero otherwise. Moreover, the
enrollment decision implies a nominal cost cr, which summarizes all the costs related to mandatory
voting such as transportation costs or a ne for not attending to vote.2 Thus, each citizen faces
the following budget constraint:
(2) pxxi + crri  hiw
This budget constraint can be expressed in real terms as follows:
(3) xi + ri  hi!;
Where  = cr=px is the real cost for being enrolled as a voter and ! = w=px the real wage.
The electoral roll, R, is composed by the sum of all those individuals that decided to be enrolled on.
Since democracy is treated as a public good, assume that d is a function of the electoral register.
That is, d = f(R), where f() is a continuous, increasing, and at least twice dierentiable function.
In sum, each citizen i must solve the following problem:
max
fx;l;rg
ui(xi; li; d)
s.t.: xi + ri  hi!
li + hi = 1(4)
R =
nX
j=1
rj = ri +
nX
j 6=i
rj
d = f(R)
Where xi  0, li; hi 2 [0; 1], ri = 0; 1, R  0, and d  0.
2Krasa and Polborn (2009) evaluated the eects of asymmetric voting costs (and information about candidates)
and subsidies over voter participation rate in a compulsory voting system.
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The optimal values for x, l, h, and r are obtained from the following equation:
(5)
@ui
@xi
=
1
!
@ui
@li
=
1

@ui
@d
f 0(R)
Where @ui=@xi, @ui=@li, and @ui=@d are the marginal utility of consumption, leisure, and democ-
racy, and f 0(R) is the partial derivative of f with respect to R.
Next section introduces an explicit solution that explores the Nash equilibrium under a society
populated by homogeneous citizens.
3. An explicit private solution
In order to obtain an explicit solution for the model outlined in the previous section, assume that
citizens' preferences can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function:
(6) ui(xi; li; d) = x
i1
i l
i2
i d
i3
Where the superscript i in the 's allows to evaluate if the democratic society is populated by citizens
with homogeneous or heterogeneous preferences over consumption, leisure, and/or democracy.
If the society is populated by homogeneous citizens, then they have the same preferences over
consumption, leisure, and democracy. Thus, the citizens share the following utility function:
(7) ui(xi; li; d) = x
1
i l
2
i d
3
In addition, suppose that the democracy function is given by:
(8) d = f(R) =
R2
n
Under this particular function, the supply of democracy as a public good is bounded. That is, a
full electoral enrollment would bind the supply of democracy to n. Alternatively, the supply of this
public good would tend to zero if a representativeness crisis takes place.
After solving the equation system derived from (5), citizen i will choose the following optimal values
for the voter enrollment (r?), consumption (x?), leisure (l?), and labor supply (h?):
(9) r?i =
!


23
1 + 2 + 23

 

1 + 2
1 + 2 + 23
 nX
j 6=i
rj
(10) x?i =
1
23
0@r?i + nX
j 6=i
rj
1A
(11) l?i =
2
2!3
0@r?i + nX
j 6=i
rj
1A
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(12) h?i = 1 
2
2!3
0@r?i + nX
j 6=i
rj
1A
From equation (9) it is evident that the optimal enrollment decision of citizen i is a linear reaction
function. Since this reaction function maps the closed unit interval of r into itself, then a Nash
equilibrium can be obtained. Moreover, remember that r is a binary choice variable, then it can
be redened using the oor function in the following way :
(13) r?i =
6664max
8<:min
8<:!

23
1 + 2 + 23

 

1 + 2
1 + 2 + 23
 nX
j 6=i
rj ; 1
9=; ; 0
9=;
7775
For illustrative purposes, rst suppose that the society is populated by two citizens (i.e., n = 2)
and u() is homogeneous of degree one in consumption and leisure (i.e., 1 + 2 = 1). Accordingly,
(13) is now given by:
(14) r?i =
6664max
8<:min
8<:!

23
1 + 23

 

1
1 + 23
 nX
j 6=i
rj ; 1
9=; ; 0
9=;
7775
Therefore, the reaction function equilibrium is r?1 = r
?
2 = !3=(1 + 3). The equilibrium implies
two extreme cases for a unique Nash equilibrium, which are identied and shown in Figure 1. In
this gure, the best response of citizen one (r1) is represented by a square and a circle represents
the best response of citizen two (r2).
In the rst extreme equilibrium, the voter enrollment rate is zero if the dominant strategy is not
to be enrolled. This is true if both citizens do not value the democratic principles, 3 = 0, or their
appreciation for democracy is \too low" and less than =2(!   ) (see Figure 1(a))
The second case implies a full-enrollment equilibrium since dominant strategy for both citizens is
to be enrolled. This outcome is feasible if both citizens have a relative \high" appreciation for
democracy, which is equal or greater than =(!   ) (see Figure 1(b)).
On the other hand, the model allows a multiple Nash equilibrium if the valuation of democracy
belongs to the interval [=2(!   ); =(!   )[, which is equivalent to a partial enrollment rate (see
Figure 1(c)). Since citizens do not have contact to each other when they make a decision about
their voter enrollment status, then this equilibrium could be interpreted as a free-rider behavior.
Now, suppose that n = 3, then the reaction function equilibrium is r? = 2!3=(3 + 23) for all
i = 1; 2; 3. In this case, the zero-enrollment equilibrium is achieved if all citizens do not value
democracy or 3 < =2(!   ). Alternatively, the full-enrollment equilibrium is possible if 3 
3=2(!   ).
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The partial-enrollment equilibrium takes place if =2(!  )  3 < 3=2(!  ) and it involves two
particular situations. First, if =2(!   )  3 < =(!   ), then the best response of citizen i will
be \being enrolled" if and only if the remaining citizens are not enrolled (i.e.,
P3
j 6=i rj = 0). And
second, if =(!  )  3 < 3=2(!  ), then the best response of citizen i will be \being enrolled"
if and only if the other citizens are not fully enrolled (i.e.,
P3
j 6=i rj < 2). Therefore, the free-rider
behavior will be most likely if the voter registration rate is high and will be discarded if it is near
to zero.
0
1
0 1
r 2
r
1
(a) Zero-enrollment equilibrium: 3 <

2(! )
0
1
0 1
r 2
r
1
(b) Full-enrollment equilibrium: 3  (! )
0
1
0 1
r 2
r
1
(c) Partial enrollment equilibrium: 
2(! )  3 <

(! )
Figure 1: Representation of Nash equilibrium when n = 2.
After some algebra, it is straightforward to show that zero-enrollment and full-enrollment equilibria
are achieved if 3 < =2(!   ) and 3  n=2(!   ), respectively. Regarding to the partial-
enrollment equilibrium, the best response of citizen i will be \being enrolled" when the remaining
citizens are not enrolled if 3 < (n  1)=2(!   ), and when at least one of the remaining citizens
is enrolled if (n  1)=2(!   )  3 < n=2(!   ).
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4. Social solution, policy implications, and empirical tests
From a social perspective, suppose that a policy maker seeks to maximize the common good in this
democratic society. Therefore, the problem to be solved can be outlined as follows:
max
fx;l;r;dg
nX
i=1
i  ui(xi; li; d)
s.t.:
nX
i=1
xi + 
nX
i=1
ri 
nX
i=1
hi!
li + hi = 1(15)
nX
i=1
ri = R
d = f(R)
Where xi  0, li; hi 2 [0; 1], ri = 0; 1, R  0, d  0, and i represents the relative weight of citizen
i in the society. Therefore,
Pn
i=1 i = 1.
Combining the rst-order necessary conditions, we have that:
(16) f 0(R) =


!
 nX
i=1
@ui=@li
@ui=@d
= 
nX
i=1
@ui=@xi
@ui=@d
The above equilibrium condition yields the optimal values for x?i , l
?
i , h
?
i r
?
i , d
?, and R?. From these
values, the following concepts can be dened. The voter registration rate, , is given by:
(17)  =
1
n
nX
i=1
r?i
The citizen participation rate, , is dened as follows:
(18)  =
1
n
nX
i=1
l?i
4.1. Policy implications
From equation (13), it is straightforward to show that the reaction function equilibrium depends
on real wage (!), democracy appreciation (3), population (n), and the real enrollment cost ( =
cr=px). Thus, the policy maker can choose cr and reorient the private decision in order to maximize
the electoral roll or avoid a representativeness crisis.
In order to evaluate the policy alternatives, suppose for simplicity that citizens are homogeneous,
! = 6, and  = 2. If we assume that the appreciation for democracy is too weak, let us say 3 = 0:1,
then the Nash equilibrium will be the zero-enrollment no matter what population size has been
considered. Hence, a real enrollment cost equals to two is not optimal, then the policy maker could
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encourages the enrollment process after reducing  below 0.5, which resembles what is depicted in
Figure 2.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
δ
n
φ
3
=0.1φ
3
=6.0
Figure 2: Optimal real enrollment cost for several population sizes and democracy appreciation.
Furthermore, if 3 = 6, then the Nash equilibrium is the full-enrollment scenario. In this case, the
starting value of two for  is optimal only if the population is less than 24 citizens. Nevertheless,
this apparent high-valuation of democracy will provoke a free-rider behavior between citizens once
population size departs from 24. Therefore, if the policy maker wants to eradicate this kind of
behavior, then  has to be reduced at a faster rate than under a weaker appreciation for democratic
principles.
Finally, if the society is populated by heterogeneous citizens, where a fraction  has a low democracy
valuation and (1   ) has a strong valuation, then the policy advice is to charge a dierential
enrollment cost only if 3 is known and the potential electorate is small. Otherwise, if the potential
electorate is fairly large, then the optimal value for  must be close to zero in order to avoid a
representativeness crisis.
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4.2. Empirical tests
In order to obtain an empirical model from the above microfoundations, suppose for the sake of
simplicity that citizens are homogeneous, utility function is Cobb-Douglas, and the democracy
function is given by (8). Therefore, by substituting the partial derivatives of (7) and (8) into (16),
it is trivial to verify that:
(19)
2R?
n
=


!
 nX
i=1
2
l?i
d?
3
Where l?i , R
?, and d? denote the optimal values for leisure, electoral roll, and democracy. After
rearranging equation (19), we have that:
(20) R? =
nX
i=1
r?i =

2!3
2
 nX
i=1
l?i
Dividing both sides of (20) by population, n, then the optimal enrollment rate, ?, can be expressed
as:
(21) ? =

2!3
2

?
Where ? = R?=n and ? = (1=n)
Pn
i=1 l
?
i . The log-linearization of equation (21) implies that:
(22) ln ? = ln

23
2

+ ln(!) + ln(?)  ln()
Therefore, an empirical model that allows to test the relationship between the voter enrollment
rate and a set of economic and social variables can be stated as follows:
(23) ln i = 1 + 2 ln(!)i + 3 ln()i + 4 ln()i + "i
Where the betas are the parameters to be estimated, " the error term, and i can be a county,
region, state, country, or any geographical division.
Finally, it is remarkable that the empirical model dened in equation (23) is consistent with those
proposed in the initial empirical work on voting behavior, such as Barzel and Silberberg (1973),
Silberman and Durden (1975), or Settle and Abrams (1976).
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5. Concluding remarks
This paper aimed to make a contribution to empirical literature on voting behavior by modeling
the voter enrollment decision of rational citizens. Under this framework, citizens must voluntary
decide about their voter enrollment status based on how relevant is democracy for them. Thus, the
model was solved and analyzed from the citizen and policy maker's perspectives, which permits to
identify the following remarks.
From the private solution of the model, a null and a full-enrollment Nash equilibria were derived,
where the relative cost for voter enrollment and appreciation for democracy constituted the key
variables. These solutions are standard under a public good framework because they depend on how
much the public good (democracy) is valued by agents (citizens). Nevertheless, a third kind of Nash
equilibrium was obtained where there was a threshold for democracy valuation that encourages a
free-rider behavior. As a consequence, free-rider behavior will be more likely if voter registration
rate is close to one and will be discarded if it is near to zero.
From the social solution of the model, a policy analysis was made and a macro-level empirical model
was obtained. The optimal policy analysis suggests to set a dierentiated enrollment cost only if
citizen's democracy appreciation is known by the policy maker. On the contrary, if democracy
appreciation is unknown and the potential electorate is fairly large, then the optimal enrollment
cost has to be close to zero in order to avoid a massive free-rider behavior that triggers a represen-
tativeness crisis.
On the other hand, the resulting empirical model is coherent with the classical literature on voting
behavior by setting a structural relationship between voter participation and several social and
economic variables.
Finally, the empirical model is the outcome from aggregating the optimal responses of rational
citizens. Therefore, future empirical research that considers the empirical model outlined in this
paper and uses aggregated electoral data will be well-specied in the sense of Lichtman (1974, p.
432).
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